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INTERSECTIONALITY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY STATUS 
Serena Mayeri* 
Marital supremacy—the legal privileging of marriage—is, 
and always has been, deeply intertwined with inequalities of race, 
class, gender, and region. Many if not most of the plaintiffs who 
challenged legal discrimination based on family status in the 1960s 
and 1970s were impoverished women, men, and children of color 
who made constitutional equality claims. Yet the constitutional 
law of the family is largely silent about the status-based impact of 
laws that prefer marriage and disadvantage nonmarital families. 
While some lower courts engaged with race-, sex-, and wealth-
based discrimination arguments in family status cases, the 
Supreme Court largely avoided recognizing, much less crediting, 
their constitutional significance. Moreover, constitutional family 
status jurisprudence mostly overlooked claims to sexual 
autonomy, sex equality, and racial and economic justice arising 
from plaintiffs’ lived experience of intersecting status-based 
harms. The result is a constitutional family law canon that often 
obscures the social reality of legal regimes that elevate marriage 
at the expense of equality. 
At particular historical moments, advocates have seized 
upon social movement victories and associated developments in 
constitutional doctrine—a brief openness to race-based disparate 
impact and economic justice claims, the emergence of sexual 
privacy and sex equality principles—to expose and exploit the 
intersections between race, class, gender, and family status-based 
inequality. Plaintiffs and their lawyers made race- and poverty-
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based discrimination arguments against laws and policies that 
distinguished between individuals and families based upon 
marital status. For instance, when advocates challenged 
“illegitimacy” penalties such as the denial of wrongful death and 
workers’ compensation, inheritance rights, and government 
benefits to nonmarital children and their parents, they often 
argued that such policies had a disparate impact on families of 
color. Indeed, all of the early illegitimacy cases were brought by 
African American women and their children, but no Supreme 
Court opinion so much as mentions race. 
Intersectional harms often underpinned legal assaults on 
family status inequalities. Challenges to welfare policies that 
capped AFDC benefit amounts, as well as lawsuits against 
“suitable home” and “substitute father” policies included race 
(and sometimes “family status”) discrimination claims. Women of 
color and concerns about racially disparate impact played a 
prominent if often unspoken role in litigation challenging 
mandatory paternity disclosure for unmarried women poor 
enough to be eligible for public assistance. Constitutional and 
statutory challenges to policies excluding “unwed mothers” from 
employment frequently combined race and sex discrimination 
claims, contending that such restrictions disproportionately 
burdened women of color and frequently betrayed invidious 
racial motivation. 
Courts often decided these cases without engaging the race 
discrimination claims, and the racial context frequently receded 
from judicial consciousness as cases moved up through appellate 
courts. That is not to say that the racial subtext had no impact on 
legal decisionmakers, however: there is evidence that it did, 
sometimes to plaintiffs’ advantage. As the 1970s wore on, though, 
plaintiffs more frequently framed their claims as sex 
discrimination: they emphasized the severe disparate impact on 
women of laws penalizing nonmarital parenthood, given women’s 
disproportionate responsibility for the care and support of 
children generally and nonmarital children in particular. 
Nonmarital fathers’ claims, too, usually sounded in terms of sex 
discrimination (or due process, in the case of parental rights) 
rather than racial discrimination. Even so, women and men of 
color remained at the forefront of challenges to laws that 
discriminated based on marital status and sex. 
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Race and sex discrimination arguments were not inherently 
more progressive than other framings of plaintiffs’ constitutional 
claims, of course. Many of the race- and poverty-based 
discrimination arguments promoted by opponents of illegitimacy 
classifications in the late 1960s, for instance, were perfectly 
compatible with the prevailing judicial trope of innocent (poor, 
black) children suffering unjustly for their parents’ “sins.” And 
applying formal sex equality principles to nonmarital fatherhood 
risked obscuring the disproportionate burden mothers tended to 
bear for the care and support of nonmarital children, as well as 
economic, social, and physical power differentials between men 
and women. The political valence of equality arguments 
depended on their substantive content. To the extent that 
constitutional claims derived from the lived experiences of 
individuals and families shaped by racial, gender, sexual and 
economic subordination, they could expand the meaning of 
principles such as equality, liberty, autonomy, and due process. 
When plaintiffs invoked the Constitution to vindicate a right to 
engage in nonmarital sex without reprisal from the government or 
a private employer; to call upon the state for benefits regardless 
of marital or birth status; or to exercise parental rights over 
nonmarital children, they laid claim to the universal significance 
of their particular experience. 
The courts’ failure to recognize claims based on these 
intersectional experiences had wide-ranging and lasting 
consequences for equality law. Those consequences are visible in 
the Court’s approach to illegitimacy classifications, which sees 
their primary harm as punishing “innocent children” for parental 
“transgressions,” leaving untouched the legitimacy of privileging 
marriage in public and private law. They are visible in the federal 
constitutional jurisprudence of nonmarital fatherhood, which 
reflects the values of the divorced fathers’ rights movement and 
of traditional adoption advocacy more than feminists’ concerns 
about women’s subordination, or poverty lawyers’ desire to 
protect poor families from state intrusion. They are visible in state 
welfare policies that find no constitutional harm in requiring 
mothers to cooperate with authorities in identifying and seeking 
child support from impoverished fathers. We can also see these 
consequences in the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage 
jurisprudence, which characterizes unmarried individuals and 
nonmarital families as legally, socially, and economically inferior. 
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Marital supremacy is alive and well, even in an age of marriage 
equality. 
In previous work, I have provided detailed historical 
accounts of constitutional litigation campaigns against 
illegitimacy penalties that targeted nonmarital children and their 
parents, and of debates over the constitutionality of restrictions 
on nonmarital fathers’ parental rights.1 This Article builds on 
those accounts in an effort to think systematically about why the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of the family has so 
little to say about the status-based inequalities that prompted 
plaintiffs to bring their claims and shaped advocates’ strategy. 
Part I describes how race- and poverty-based discrimination 
arguments figured prominently in early constitutional litigation 
challenging “illegitimacy”-based classifications and asserting 
welfare rights, but receded from view by the early 1970s. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s silence on the relationship between 
race, poverty, sex equality, and family status, African American 
women attempted to redefine women’s sexual and economic 
citizenship in the 1970s based on the intersectional experience of 
unmarried mothers of color, as Part II chronicles. Profound 
disagreements persisted, however, among advocates and 
policymakers who contested the relationship between poverty 
and family structure, and the role of the state in affecting both. 
Cases concerning the constitutional rights of unmarried fathers 
became a battleground for competing conceptions of parenthood 
outside of marriage. Part III explores how unmarried fathers of 
color presented constitutional claims that reflected the 
intertwined impact of race, national origin, gender, and class, with 
little success. The Article concludes by assessing the 
consequences of constitutional law’s erasure of the intersectional 
experiences that spurred family status equality claims. 
I. THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE IN 
WELFARE AND ILLEGITIMACY CASES 
No educated observer of the politics of public assistance and 
nonmarital childbearing in the 1960s could fail to acknowledge 
 
 1. Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 
103 CAL. L. REV. 1277 (2015) [hereinafter Marital Supremacy]; Serena Mayeri, Foundling 
Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292 
(2016) [hereinafter Foundling Fathers]. 
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the significance of race for welfare and family policy. In the 
preceding decades, African American women and children 
gained access to Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) funds 
formerly reserved for the presumptively white “deserving poor,” 
and political resistance intensified accordingly.2 In the years after 
Brown, resistance to racial desegregation efforts frequently took 
the form of moral regulations targeting “illegitimacy,” as legal 
historian Anders Walker has shown.3 Proposed legislation at the 
state and local level included the denial of public assistance, 
institutionalization of nonmarital children, and sterilization and 
imprisonment of their parents.4 The most notorious of these 
retaliatory measures, Louisiana’s 1960 “suitable home” law, 
purged thousands of “illegitimate” black children from welfare 
rolls and sparked a national outcry.5 Winifred Bell’s influential 
1965 study, Aid to Dependent Children, left no doubt of the 
connections between massive resistance and punitive anti-welfare 
measures.6 The Moynihan Report, released the same year, 
solidified popular understandings of a connection between family 
structure, poverty, and violence.7 By 1968, journalist Fred P. 
Graham wrote that “‘[i]llegitimacy,’ like ‘crime in the streets,’ is 
becoming a substitute in many minds for the ‘Negro problem.’”8 
Child welfare advocates had long criticized illegitimacy 
penalties for unjustly imposing crippling legal disabilities and 
social stigma upon nonmarital children.9 Civil rights advances 
provided new constitutional weapons against such laws; racial 
discrimination seemed an apt description of illegitimacy penalties’ 
purpose and impact, as well as a useful analogue to illegitimacy-
based discrimination. In a series of lawsuits beginning with Levy 
v. Louisiana, family law professor and scholar of illegitimacy 
 
 2. See, e.g., JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE 43–48 
(2005). 
 3. See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW 5–6 (2009). 
 4. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1286 & n.30. 
 5. See, e.g., MITTELSTADT, supra note 2, at 86–91. I use the terms  “legitimate” and 
“illegitimate” without any wish to endorse their denigration of nonmarital families. For a 
fuller explanation of this usage, please see Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 
1279 n.4. 
 6. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965). 
 7. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action 
(1965). 
 8. Fred P. Graham, It’s Tough to Be Illegitimate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1968, at E10. 
 9. See, e.g., Justine Wise Polier, Illegitimate!, WOMEN’S HOME COMPANION, Aug. 
1947, at 32. 
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Harry Krause collaborated with lawyers at the ACLU and 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund to attack discrimination against 
illegitimate children in wrongful death recovery, inheritance, and 
workers’ compensation.10 Plaintiffs in these early cases were, to a 
person, African American mothers and children from the South. 
LDF lawyers specifically requested in Levy that Krause 
“show the court that many policies which on their face are 
designed to control ‘morals’ or which bear heaviest on the poor, 
have a profound impact on the Negro community, which has a 
high rate of illegitimacy and poverty.”11 Accordingly, Krause’s 
amicus brief for the LDF enumerated how “disproportionately 
more Negro children than white children are born out of 
wedlock,” and adoption rates for white children were orders of 
magnitude higher.12 As a result, “95.8 percent of all persons 
affected by discrimination against illegitimates under the 
[challenged Louisiana wrongful death] statute are Negroes . . . 
.[T]he classification of illegitimacy . . . is a euphemism for 
discrimination against Negroes.”13 All of the briefs supporting 
Louise Levy’s children framed the central injustice of their 
exclusion from recovery for her wrongful death as the punishment 
of innocent children for their parents’ illicit conduct.14 
No coordinated strategy guided the illegitimacy cases to the 
Supreme Court.15 Welfare rights advocates, however, deliberately 
chose cases involving racially invidious intent and effect, 
employing a “southern strategy” designed to highlight especially 
egregious civil rights abuses.16 Sylvester Smith’s challenge to 
Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which denied public 
 
 10. For more on Krause, see Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the 
Illegitimacy Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 92–94 (2003); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, 
supra note 1, at 1288–90; Harry D. Krause, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 667 (1997). 
 11. Letter from Leroy Clark, NAACP LDF, to Harry Krause, University of Illinois 
School of Law, Dec. 4, 1967, at 1, Norman Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13. 
 12. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae at 18, 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112827. 
 13. Id. Norman Dorsen and his ACLU colleagues argued that classifications based 
on birth status, like those based on race, should be subject to strict scrutiny. Brief for 
Appellants, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508), 1967 WL 113865. 
 14. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1292. 
 15. The NAACP, LDF, and the ACLU were repeat players in the early illegitimacy 
litigation, and legal aid lawyers later participated in many of the cases, but no concerted 
effort brought “test cases” to the Supreme Court; instead, cases arose more or less 
organically. For more, see Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1343–44. 
 16. MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 56 (1993). 
MAYERI_DRAFT 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:01 AM 
2017] INTERSECTIONALITY & FAMILY STATUS 383 
 
assistance to mothers suspected of extramarital sexual 
relationships, included arguments about racially discriminatory 
purpose and effect lifted from the Levy briefs.17 Welfare rights 
advocates pressed race discrimination claims outside the South as 
well, advancing similar arguments in New Jersey Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Cahill, which challenged a requirement of 
“ceremonial marriage” for cohabiting couples to be eligible for 
certain public assistance benefits.18 
Though some lower court opinions engaged plaintiffs’ race 
discrimination arguments, none of the welfare or illegitimacy 
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the late 1960s mentioned 
race. In King v. Smith, the three-judge federal district court 
acknowledged evidence of racially discriminatory purpose and 
effect in a footnote, but did not rest its equal protection holding 
on those grounds. The lower court praised the state’s reluctance 
to “underwrite financially or approve situations which are 
generally considered immoral” as “laudable,” but noted that 
“punishment under the regulation is against needy children, not 
against the participants in the conduct condemned by the 
regulation.”19 The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach to 
decide the case on statutory grounds, with Chief Justice Warren 
careful “to emphasize” that states remained free to “discourag[e] 
illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy . . . by other means, subject 
to constitutional limitations” he did not specify.20 
By 1972, political shifts on and off the Court had devalued 
the currency of race discrimination arguments, especially those 
that relied primarily on disparate impact. When Willie Mae 
Weber and her children challenged the exclusion of illegitimate 
children from the Louisiana workers’ compensation statute’s 
definition of “child” after their father’s death in a job-related 
accident, they were represented by Vanue Lacour, an 
accomplished young civil rights attorney and one of the few 
African Americans practicing law in Louisiana. When Lacour 
wrote to the ACLU to ask for assistance as amicus, he specifically 
requested “an emphasis on the fact that the practical effect of the 
 
 17. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1298. 
 18. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). Martha Davis 
writes that welfare rights advocates retreated from the “southern strategy” in the late 
1960s, and focused resources mostly on Northern states. DAVIS, supra note 16, at 68–69. 
 19. Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 39–40 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
 20. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333–34 (1968). 
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law . . . is to discriminate against black people.”21 The ACLU’s 
brief, however, did not reiterate the race discrimination claims 
prominent in previous illegitimacy litigation. And Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr.’s much-quoted opinion for the Court in Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty wholeheartedly embraced the theory that illegitimacy-
based classifications were unconstitutional because they punished 
“hapless” children for the “irresponsible liaisons” of their 
parents.22 Discrimination against illegitimate children was an 
“illogical” and “unjust” means of deterring illicit adult sex; the 
state’s goal of promoting marriage itself posed no constitutional 
problem.23 
Though Justice Powell, new to the Court, might not have 
been exposed to the race- and poverty-based discrimination 
arguments prominent in the earlier illegitimacy cases, he did 
consider—and reject—such claims in the welfare context. Welfare 
rights strategists hoped Jefferson v. Hackney would establish that 
inadequate public assistance provision not only contravened the 
Social Security Act but also discriminated against people of color 
in violation of the equal protection clause.24 Whereas public 
assistance programs for the (predominantly white, Anglo) elderly 
and disabled provided close to one hundred percent of what the 
federal government deemed basic subsistence needs, Texas 
AFDC recipients, more than eighty percent of whom were 
African American and Mexican American single mothers and 
nonmarital children, received less than half of the subsistence 
standard.25 Plaintiffs attacked these disparities as unconstitutional 
discrimination based on race and family status: the Center for 
Social Welfare Policy and Law’s brief cited Bell’s study and 
highlighted past attempts by Southern states to punish nonmarital 
births through criminalization, denial of benefits, and suitable 
home and substitute parent regulations. Texas, in particular, “was 
 
 21. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1306. 
 22. Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164, 176, 183 (1972). For more on Weber, see Mayeri, 
Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1305–10. 
 23. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1307–08 (quoting Weber v. Aetna, 
406 U.S. 164, 175–76). 
 24. Welfare rights advocates brought a case similar to Jefferson v. Hackney in Ohio. 
See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 61 (2005). 
 25. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 558 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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a prime and vigorous perpetrator” of such racially motivated 
measures.26 
Justice Powell, perhaps the most likely swing vote in 
Jefferson, did not think much of the constitutional race 
discrimination argument.27 His clerk Hamilton P. Fox III viewed 
disparate impact analysis as a dangerous slippery slope. “If the 
Court measures racial discrimination entirely by impact,” Fox 
wrote, “then the Court would compel lawmakers and 
administrators to take into account racial balance in every 
situation.” Racial impact was not “irrelevant,” in Fox’s view, “but 
its relevance is that it tends to show motivation and purpose.”28 
Fox saw no such evidence of purpose in the record, and he 
believed the discrepancies had a rational basis: whereas the aged 
and disabled largely were incapable of supporting themselves, 
AFDC recipients might be encouraged to work and reduce their 
“dependency” on public funds. Fox found this logic neither 
“intelligent” nor “humane,” but “reluctant[ly]” concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims should be rejected. Powell 
apparently agreed with Fox’s constitutional conclusion, though he 
ultimately declined to follow his clerk’s recommendation that the 
Court find for the plaintiffs on statutory grounds. 
Coming on the heels of other welfare rights defeats, the 
Court’s 5-4 decision in Jefferson sounded the death knell for race-
based disparate impact claims in welfare cases, and hastened the 
demise of poverty lawyers’ attempt to constitutionalize welfare 
rights.29 Once central to the constitutional case against 
illegitimacy classifications and to welfare rights activists’ 
 
 26. Brief for Appellants, Jefferson v. Hackney, 30–36 (citing Bell, Aid to Dependent 
Children). Davis writes that welfare rights strategist Ed Sparer recommended positioning 
Jefferson as the first equal protection case to reach the Supreme Court because of its 
“dramatic and egregious facts” relative to contemporaneous cases. DAVIS, supra note 16, 
at 134. 
 27. Justice Harry Blackmun, who, like Powell, had recently joined the Court, had 
written his first opinion in a welfare case, Wyman v. James, rejecting the plaintiff’s claims. 
See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN 61–62 (2005). 
 28. Hamilton P. Fox III, Bench Memo, Jefferson v. Hackney [406 U.S. 535], on file 
with the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921-1998, Ms 001, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, 
Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA [hereinafter Powell Papers], Box 370, 
Folder 28. 
 29. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding restrictions on 
welfare benefits to large families against equal protection challenge); Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 
(upholding caseworker searches of AFDC recipients’ homes against constitutional 
challenge). See also DAVIS, supra note 16, at 134. 
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constitutional strategy, by the early 1970s race-based disparate 
impact arguments faded into the background of the Court’s 
welfare and illegitimacy jurisprudence. In both contexts, when the 
Court found for plaintiffs, it did so in the name of protecting 
needy children, rather than vindicating claims of racial or 
economic justice for adults and their families. 
II. SEXUAL CITIZENSHIP, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, AND 
INTERSECTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new generation of feminist 
and welfare rights critiques challenged the child-focused account 
of illegitimacy penalties’ harm and focused attention on how 
punishing nonmarital childbearing and nonmarital children 
subordinated adult women—especially women of color, and poor 
and low-income women—impeding their sexual and reproductive 
autonomy, their economic independence, and their ability to care 
for their families. 
African American women as individuals and as activists in 
the grassroots welfare rights movement struggled against the 
racist, sexist dehumanization of welfare recipients, prominently 
including the state’s intrusion on the personal and sexual lives of 
black single mothers. Sylvester Smith’s challenge to Alabama’s 
substitute father law not only underscored the racial motivations 
and effects of punitive anti-illegitimacy welfare measures, but also 
advanced a robust vision of sexual autonomy and privacy. Smith 
resisted conventional notions of respectability: when told that her 
family would be ineligible for ADC benefits if she did not 
disprove rumors of her intimate relations with a married father of 
nine children, Smith adamantly refused to confirm or deny the 
affair. “I told [the caseworker] it was none of her business,” Smith 
later recalled, adding that she had every intention of “going with” 
whomever she wished as long as she was young enough to enjoy 
the company of men.30 Smith, who worked daily eight-hour shifts 
as a cook in Selma for less than twenty dollars per week to support 
her four children and one grandchild, valued her social and sexual 
autonomy enough to risk losing the stingy but significant ADC 
benefit for which her family was eligible.31 
 
 30. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1297. 
 31. For more, see Rickie Solinger, The First Welfare Case: Money, Sex, Marriage, and 
White Supremacy in Selma, 1966: A Reproductive Justice Analysis, 22 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13 
(2010). 
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Smith’s defiant declaration of sexual independence did not 
translate perfectly into legal or constitutional claims, but her 
arguments sounded in terms of sexual privacy and the right not to 
have government benefits conditioned upon marriage or 
celibacy.32 Her lawyer, Martin Garbus, argued that the substitute 
father regulation, by requiring mothers to disclose their “most 
intimate relationships,” violated her rights to privacy and freedom 
of association.33 ACLU lawyers who litigated the early 
illegitimacy cases made supportive arguments outside of court: in 
1967, Norman Dorsen, David Rudovsky, and John “Chip” Gray 
argued for an expansive interpretation of Griswold v. Connecticut 
to “include [all] private sexual activity between consenting 
adults,” and suggested that “the right of government to prohibit 
or discourage ‘immoral’ conduct which damages no other public 
interest has been seriously challenged.”34 In 1969, Rudovsky and 
Gray interpreted Levy and its companion case, Glona v. 
American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, to require 
strict judicial scrutiny of laws that discriminated against the 
parents of nonmarital children.35 The Court’s 1972 decision in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, invalidating a contraceptive ban for 
unmarried individuals, encouraged civil libertarians and feminists 
to hope for an expansive interpretation of sexual and 
reproductive freedom outside the bonds of marriage.36 
The declining fortunes of race-based constitutional disparate 
impact claims, poverty-based equal protection claims and the 
welfare rights movement coincided with the rise of feminist legal 
advocacy and the emergence of constitutional sex equality law in 
the early 1970s. Feminist lawyers and commentators offered a 
sharp critique of the approach promoted by Harry Krause and 
embraced by the Court, which framed the primary harm of 
illegitimacy penalties as their injury to blameless children 
powerless to prevent parental misconduct. Young lawyers Patricia 
Tenoso and Aleta Wallach wrote in 1974 of “an independent 
justification for abolition of illegitimacy: the right of women to 
self-determination requires that they be free from all forms of 
 
 32. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1298. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1296–97 (quoting Norman Dorsen & David Rudovsky, Comment, Equality 
for the Illegitimate?, WELFARE L. BULL., May 1967, at 15). 
 35.  John C. Gray Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate, 
118 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1969). 
 36. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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male domination.”37 They excoriated Krause’s focus on 
ascertaining paternity and extracting child support from 
biological fathers, contending that state policy should instead 
“treat the mother as an economic resource” by “eliminat[ing] 
barriers to [] employment” for unmarried mothers and 
guaranteeing “adequate governmental support of all unmarried 
mothers and their children.”38 “Illegitimacy,” they contended, was 
only a problem because law and society made it so; patriarchy and 
poverty were the true culprits.39 
Like some welfare rights advocates, feminists such as 
Wallach and Tenoso questioned the foundational premises of 
marital supremacy, including the two-parent nuclear family’s 
superiority, the undesirability of nonmarital childbearing, and the 
privatization of dependency.40 Constitutional litigation was not a 
medium ideally suited to translating such revolutionary critiques 
into action. Nevertheless, plaintiffs and their advocates advanced 
feminist arguments that illegitimacy penalties imposed a 
disproportionate economic and social burden upon women, 
especially the poor women of color who dominated the ranks of 
nonmarital motherhood: Katie Mae Andrews and four other 
African American women who lost or were refused jobs as 
teachers by a white superintendent in a rural Mississippi school 
district because they had children “out of wedlock”;41 Linda 
Gomez, who challenged a Texas law exempting fathers of 
nonmarital children from child support obligations;42 the women 
threatened by Connecticut and other states with fines and 
imprisonment as well as the denial of public assistance for refusing 
to disclose the identity of their children’s fathers;43 Jessie Trimble, 
 
 37. Aleta Wallach & Patricia Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried 
Women and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, 
and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23, 25 (1974). 
 38. Patricia Tenoso & Aleta Wallach, Book Review, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 845, 850 
(1972). 
 39. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1312 (citing Wallach and Tenoso). 
 40. On privatized dependency, see, for example, MARTHA FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 167–68 (1995); Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds, 
and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415 (2005). 
 41. See Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), 
aff’d, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976). 
 42. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). 
 43. See Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202, 206 n.6 (D. Conn. 1973), supplemented, 365 
F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975). 
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Lois Fernandez, and fellow plaintiffs in lawsuits attacking 
discriminatory inheritance laws in Illinois and Pennsylvania;44 
Margaret Gonzales, who contested the exclusion of unmarried 
mothers from Social Security survivors’ benefits.45 
Plaintiffs and their lawyers emphasized how illegitimacy 
penalties often forced women to bear most or all of the economic 
burden of supporting nonmarital children after fathers died or 
deserted their families; how such laws shamed and punished 
women for illicit sex while allowing men to escape the 
consequences with impunity; and how denying jobs, child support 
payments, government benefits, and inheritance rights to 
nonmarital families effectively restricted women’s reproductive 
autonomy by penalizing their decision to bear and raise 
nonmarital children. They protested when illegitimacy penalties 
continued the tradition of invasively patrolling poor women’s 
personal lives by conditioning sustenance on the disclosure of 
sexual relationships or paternity. 
Some of these cases were obviously and explicitly entwined 
with the struggle for racial justice. In Andrews v. Drew Municipal 
Separate School District, Superintendent George F. Pettey 
presided over a school district that had mightily resisted 
desegregation; most white families had decamped to “segregation 
academies,” leaving the schools more than eighty percent black 
but the ranks of teachers and administrators increasingly 
dominated by whites. The disparate impact of excluding 
nonmarital parents was unmistakable: all five of the rejected 
applicants were African American women, and as many as forty 
percent of Drew’s African American students were born to 
unmarried parents. The school district’s attorney was 
segregationist Senator James O. Eastland’s son-in-law, and he 
called a once-prominent defender of racial segregation, Ernest 
van den Haag, to testify. Andrews’s attorney, Charles Victor 
McTeer, a twenty-four-year-old African American protégé of the 
Center for Constitutional Rights’ Morty Stavis, enlisted social 
psychologist Kenneth Clark and civil rights icon Fannie Lou 
Hamer to testify on behalf of the plaintiffs. District Court Judge 
William Keady certified Mrs. Hamer as an expert on the “social 
mores of the black community.” Briefs submitted by McTeer, by 
 
 44. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 45. See Boles v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Tex. 1978), rev’d, 443 U.S. 282 
(1979). 
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feminist lawyers Nancy Stearns and Rhonda Copelon at CCR, 
and amici including the Equal Rights Advocates and ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project made race as well as sex discrimination 
arguments against the exclusion of unmarried mothers from 
employment. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument 
was explicitly intersectional, requesting that the Justices apply 
strict scrutiny because the case implicated so many different rights 
and theories.46 
In other cases, although everyone understood that the law’s 
impact would fall disproportionately on women of color, race was 
less a constitutional hook than a subtly invoked subtext. Their 
private correspondence makes clear that child welfare advocates 
and their allies understood Roe v. Norton, the challenge to 
Connecticut’s punitive mandatory paternity disclosure law, as 
part of a larger campaign for racial and economic justice. Jessie 
and Deta Mona Trimble’s lawyers made race as well as sex 
discrimination arguments when challenging Illinois’s inheritance 
laws in state court, but apparently dropped the race-based 
disparate impact arguments on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The legal aid and poverty lawyers who challenged the exclusion 
of illegitimate children and their parents from Social Security 
benefits noted the laws’ race-based disparate impact, but by the 
mid-1970s constitutional disparate impact claims based on race, 
especially in the context of federal government benefits, seemed 
like a non-starter after decisions in cases such as Washington v. 
Davis (1976) confirmed that the Court would require proof of 
discriminatory intent to prove an equal protection violation.47 
Bringing race to the surface of illegitimacy penalty cases 
involved risks as well as benefits. On the one hand, judges who 
were sympathetic to the civil rights cause or frustrated with the 
intransigence of white segregationist resisters might view 
evidence of racially disparate impact as sufficient to suggest 
actionable discriminatory intent. Judges like William Keady of 
Mississippi, who confronted pitched battles over school 
desegregation the moment he ascended the bench in 1968, could 
 
 46. For in-depth discussions of Andrews, see Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 
1, at 1316, 1319–20; SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION ch. 5 (2011). 
 47. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney (1979); 
MAYERI supra note 46, at ch. 4; Katie Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of 
Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 50–55 (2016). 
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hardly fail to recognize what was at stake when he received racist 
hate mail excoriating him for endorsing “[h]eifers” “breeding kids 
out of wedlock” at taxpayer expense. 48 On the other hand, 
advocates did not wish to suggest that African Americans adhered 
to different moral standards than whites, or that black 
communities condoned the “schoolgirl pregnancies” that were the 
ostensible target of school administrators’ exclusionary policies. 
Sensitive to this delicate balance, social psychologist Kenneth 
Clark emphasized in his Andrews testimony that sexual mores and 
behavior did not differ appreciably along racial lines: black and 
white Americans alike regularly defied moral proscriptions 
against nonmarital sex. Rather, he contended, poor African 
American youth lacked access to contraception and to 
information about preventing pregnancy.49 Fannie Lou Hamer’s 
testimony excoriated whites’ sexual hypocrisy in laymen’s terms: 
if the school district excluded all employees, white and black, who 
had ever engaged in nonmarital sex, “lock up the doors. There 
won’t be any school.”50 
Some of the protagonists in illegitimacy penalty cases sought 
to conform as best they could to existing normative ideals; some 
rejected the politics of respectability altogether; and still others 
sought to redefine its terms. At one end of this spectrum, 
attorneys for the Levy children portrayed their mother Louise, 
who died of hypertensive uremia after a negligent misdiagnosis in 
a segregated New Orleans hospital, as a paragon of maternal 
piety, devotion, and self-sufficiency.51 Briefs noted that she 
labored as a domestic worker to send her children to Catholic 
school and did not depend on welfare.52 Ms. Levy, this depiction 
implied, threatened neither the public fisc nor the availability of 
low-wage labor; her educational choices did not even evoke the 
specter of public school desegregation. Indeed, attorney Adolph 
Levy (no relation) emphasized that if the Levy children were 
denied recovery for their mother’s wrongful death, “the tortfeasor 
 
 48. MAYERI supra note 46, at 157–58. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 151. 
 51. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy? 20 AM. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 395 (2012); see also Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1290. 
 52. See Murray, supra note 51, at 395. 
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need reimburse no one. The State must support the tragic 
victims.”53 
At the opposite end of the spectrum were women who 
celebrated sexual liberty and viewed single parenthood as a 
laudable choice, not a regrettable mistake. Sylvester Smith 
staunchly defended her right to receive aid from the state without 
divulging her personal business to a caseworker and without 
forswearing extramarital sex or male companionship. Whereas 
Katie Mae Andrews and Lestine Rogers, the named plaintiffs in 
Andrews, presented themselves as churchgoing Sunday school 
teachers who had become parents because of ignorance or 
inability to access birth control, teacher’s aide applicant Violet 
Burnett unapologetically refused to condemn premarital sex or to 
model abstinence to her students. When asked how she would 
counsel a student about engaging in (nonmarital) sexual 
intercourse, Burnett replied that she saw no harm in it, and would 
advise students to do as they pleased.54 Lois Fernandez, an 
African American community activist from Philadelphia who 
sued and lobbied to persuade Pennsylvania’s governor and 
legislature to abolish many of the legal disabilities associated with 
illegitimacy, spoke proudly of single parenthood as a morally valid 
choice worthy of equal dignity.55 Fernandez actively fought the 
“stereotype that mothers of out of wedlock children are 
promiscuous,” and resisted community norms prescribing that 
children should be given their father’s surname.56 
Many plaintiffs and their advocates neither embraced nor 
wholly rejected prevailing social and sexual norms, but instead 
worked to redefine respectability itself by rehabilitating the image 
of unmarried motherhood. When Mississippi school officials 
argued that unmarried parents set a poor moral example for their 
impressionable students, the plaintiffs and their allies countered 
with a robust defense of single mothers’ courage, fortitude, and 
moral character that emphasized their valiant efforts to obtain 
education and employment against all odds. Women like Katie 
Mae Andrews were admirable role models: college graduates who 
 
 53. Petitions for Writs of Certiorari and Review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Circuit, State of Louisiana, at 4, Levy v. State, 193 So.2d 530 (La. 1967) (No. 48518), 
collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 14. 
 54. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 55. Stephen Franklin, Mother Wins Fight To End Stigma of Illegitimacy, THE 
BULLETIN, Dec. 10, 1978, GB3. 
 56. Id. 
MAYERI_DRAFT 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:01 AM 
2017] INTERSECTIONALITY & FAMILY STATUS 393 
 
sought meaningful employment in order to support themselves 
and their children. Rather than relying on paltry public assistance 
benefits to supplement the dead-end, low-wage menial labor 
traditionally available to African American women, Andrews and 
her compatriots lifted themselves and their children out of 
poverty. Fannie Lou Hamer admonished white school officials for 
placing women like Andrews in a catch-22: “[W]hen you say we 
are lifting ourselves up and you tell us to get off of welfare, then 
when peoples try to go to school to get off of welfare to support 
themselves, this is another way of knocking them down.”57 Mae 
Bertha Carter, the married mother of thirteen children who had 
almost single-handedly integrated the Drew, Mississippi schools, 
lent her moral stature to the plaintiffs’ cause, testifying that she 
would be proud to see Ms. Andrews teach her children.58 
The redefinition of sexual citizenship by women of color 
expanded the scope of reproductive autonomy to include the right 
to give birth to and raise children regardless of financial means, 
marital status, or the presence of a man in the household. In the 
early 1970s, as abortion restrictions fell and women of color and 
their allies exposed and protested involuntary sterilization, 
plaintiffs and their lawyers emphasized that the right to 
reproductive choice included the right to have children as well as 
the right not to have them. Some, like Andrews and Hamer, 
personally opposed or had religious objections to abortion. 
Hamer had experienced and remonstrated against coerced 
hysterectomies and tubal ligations, known as “Mississippi 
appendectomies” thanks to her advocacy. Such abuses, which 
occurred without women’s knowledge or consent, or were 
required as a condition of receiving medical care or public 
assistance, were hardly confined to Mississippi; less drastic 
penalties for nonmarital childbearing such as employment 
restrictions and denials of public assistance, were even more 
widespread. Whereas abortion rights jurisprudence highlighted 
the right not to bear children, and still bore the imprint of 
population control, feminists in CCR and in grassroots 
 
 57. See Appendix at 102, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 
(No. 74-1318). 
 58. Id. at 113–14. 
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organizations representing women of color advanced a broader 
reproductive justice agenda.59 
This vision of sexual citizenship also encompassed women’s 
prerogative to make independent decisions about their families 
and households without state interference, to exercise rights 
commensurate with their responsibilities. The women who 
challenged Connecticut’s mandatory paternity disclosure law in 
Roe v. Norton confronted disapprobation for depriving their 
children of paternal financial support and a relationship with their 
fathers: “Why,” asked the state attorney general, “should a 
mother be permitted, by her inaction, to cast her child into the 
eternal caverns of illegitimacy[?]”60 Federal district court Judge 
M. Joseph Blumenfeld, liberal reputation notwithstanding, 
castigated “recalcitrant mother[s]” for acting against the interests 
of their “innocent children,” and upheld the statute as 
“operat[ing] prophylactically against the adverse differential 
treatment which the unwed mothers would impose on their 
children.”61 Women forced to identify their children’s father or 
face imprisonment protested both the intrusion on their personal 
privacy and the implication that they were not best positioned to 
assess their children’s best interests. For some women, they 
insisted, keeping paternity private was the most responsible 
decision they could make for their families; the alternative, 
several women testified, was to risk physical violence. Others 
worried that holding a former sexual partner legally liable for 
child support would cause a voluntarily involved father to flee, or 
disrupt an impending marriage to another man willing to adopt 
the mother’s children. Child welfare experts warned that forcing 
an unwilling mother to identify her child’s father would cause 
material and psychic harm to the child, hardly ever outweighed by 
the often- illusory promise of material or affective support.62 
Prominent pediatric psychiatrist Albert Solnit testified that 
incarcerating mothers would be “catastrophic” for children, and, 
moreover, that “the one who has the care and the responsibility 
 
 59. See, e.g., JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR IN THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (2003); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997); JAEL 
SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZING FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2004). 
 60. Brief of the Appellee at 10, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (No. 73-6033), 
1974 WL 186124. 
 61. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 72, 79, 79 n. 23 (D. Conn. 1973). 
 62. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1321. 
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and the loving affectionate bond” was the ablest and most 
deserving judge of her child’s best interests.63 
Perhaps even more than plaintiffs, advocates who opposed 
illegitimacy penalties varied widely in their attitudes toward 
sexual and family autonomy, sex equality, and the political 
economy of reproduction, parenthood and poverty. To some 
degree, this was a matter of context, emphasis, and strategy. When 
advocates could frame the plaintiffs’ position as consistent with 
the privatization of dependency, they understandably did. For 
instance, in cases involving employment discrimination, child 
support, and inheritance law, lawyers often reminded courts that 
without income from a job or private financial support from a 
living or deceased father, women and their children would place 
a burden on the public fisc. Such arguments had less purchase, of 
course, when finding for the plaintiffs would increase public 
assistance costs, as in the mandatory paternity disclosure cases. 
There, advocates argued that government officials’ professed 
solicitude for innocent children masked their real aims of 
minimizing public welfare expenditures and punishing poor 
women for nonmarital childbearing. 
But advocates who opposed illegitimacy penalties also 
disagreed more fundamentally about family, poverty, and welfare 
policy. At one end of the spectrum were adherents of the 
Moynihanian ethos who saw nonmarital childbearing and 
“matriarchal” family structure as inherently problematic, if not 
pathological. To them, “illegitimacy” was both a “psychic 
catastrophe,” in the words of one often-quoted scholar, and a 
devastating social scourge. These advocates recognized and 
condemned punitive anti-illegitimacy laws as cruel and racist, but 
saw their impact on blameless children as the primary harm they 
wrought. They prioritized the restoration of African American 
men to their normative roles as breadwinners, husbands, and 
fathers; to the extent poor men were unable to take their proper 
place as heads of households, measures to identify and hold them 
responsible for financial support could at least mitigate the social, 
economic, and psychological devastation of fatherlessness. At the 
other end of the spectrum were feminist and welfarist advocates 
who emphasized women’s sexual, reproductive, and economic 
autonomy, truly equal employment opportunity and access to 
 
 63. Id. (quoting Albert Solnit). 
MAYERI_DRAFT 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:01 AM 
396 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:377 
 
good jobs but also the freedom to devote themselves to family 
care without being forced to depend upon a man for financial 
support. 
Between these poles, advocates held varying views of the 
state’s proper role in creating the conditions necessary for women 
and their families to enjoy freedom and equality. Herbert 
Semmel, a poverty lawyer who later argued unsuccessfully in the 
Supreme Court that mothers of nonmarital children should be 
eligible for Social Security survivors’ benefits, believed the 
emerging emphasis on child support enforcement to be 
misguided. With anthropologist Carol Stack, who studied 
extended kin networks in impoverished black communities, 
Semmel argued in 1973 that “[l]arge-scale efforts to seek 
contributions from nonsupporting fathers would do little or 
nothing to help dependent AFDC children” because poor black 
fathers lacked the job opportunities and resources to make more 
than sporadic voluntary financial contributions and aggressive 
enforcement efforts would likely discourage “sorely needed 
material, psychological and social support which would otherwise 
be forthcoming from the father and his kin.”64 When low-income 
fathers did pay child support, such monies went directly to the 
state as reimbursements or offsets of AFDC funds; mothers and 
children did not benefit. Ultimately, Stack and Semmel 
concluded, a “national income maintenance program should offer 
assistance to all needy persons,” regardless of family status or the 
presence of children in the household; to do otherwise would fail 
to serve communities in which shifting networks of neighbors and 
kin provided care and support to families.65 Harry Krause, in 
contrast, prioritized paternity determinations and embraced 
enhanced enforcement efforts: he contended that state and local 
governments simply could not meet the needs of the growing 
population of single parent households with public funds, and thus 
strengthening child support collection was a public policy 
imperative.66 
 
 64. Carol B. Stack & Herbert Semmel, The Concept of the Family in the Poor Black 
Community, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER NO. 12 (PART II): THE FAMILY, 
POVERTY, AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, S. COMM. ON FISCAL POL’Y, 93RD CONG. 294 
(Comm. Print 1973). 
 65. Id. at 305. 
 66. Harry D. Krause, Child Welfare, Parental Responsibility, and the State, in 
STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, supra note 64, at 273–74. 
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By the 1980s, Krause’s vision had triumphed, due in part to a 
convergence between longstanding attempts to penalize 
nonmarital sex by holding poor and low-income men of color 
financially responsible for the children of their sexual partners; 
the efforts of some feminists to hold fathers responsible post-
divorce; the conservative fiscal imperative to privatize 
dependency; and the rise of the divorced fathers’ rights 
movement, which conceded child support obligations in exchange 
for formal sex equality in custody rights.67 These forces buffeted 
unmarried fathers, largely unorganized and often poor; even 
those who brought constitutional parental rights claims all the 
way to the U.S. Supreme Court did not do as part of a concerted 
or mobilized campaign.68 Nevertheless, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
nonmarital parenthood became a key battleground for 
disagreements among feminists and anti-poverty advocates over 
the role of fathers, mothers, and the state in providing care and 
financial support to poor children and families. 
III. WHITEWASHING NONMARITAL FATHERHOOD 
Like unmarried mothers, nonmarital fathers used 
constitutional litigation to seek rights and to rehabilitate their 
image. Again, many of the plaintiffs in the early Supreme Court 
cases were persons of color and of limited means. As in the 
“illegitimacy” suits, the unwed fathers’ cases that reached the 
Court did so not as the result of a coordinated strategy but rather 
as a matter of chance. The race, class, and gender politics of 
fathers’ constitutional claims differed significantly from those of 
nonmarital children and their mothers, however. Leon Quilloin, 
Abdiel Caban, Curtis Parham, and plaintiffs who challenged 
discrimination against nonmarital fathers and children in 
citizenship laws in Fiallo v. Bell made sex discrimination claims, 
but none so much as mentioned race. Poverty law strategy played 
a central role in advocates’ thinking about cases involving 
parental rights; feminist organizations, deeply conflicted about 
nonmarital fatherhood, largely stayed out of constitutional 
 
 67. For an excellent in-depth treatment of the divorced fathers’ rights movement 
during this period, see generally Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ 
Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016). 
 68. On the contrast between the mobilized, predominantly white middle class 
divorced fathers’ rights movement and unorganized nonmarital fathers, see Mayeri, 
Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2373–92. 
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litigation in the Supreme Court until the 1980s.69 But by then, 
race, poverty, and even sex equality receded almost completely 
from the jurisprudence of nonmarital fatherhood. 
Whereas “unwed mothers” had long been a focal point of 
policymakers’ concern and scholars’ attention, nonmarital fathers 
became objects of sustained study only in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Efforts to hold impoverished men of color responsible for 
supporting their biological children—or the children of their 
nonmarital sexual partners—intensified. Rates of nonmarital 
cohabitation and childbearing rose; no-fault divorce further 
increased the ranks of single fathers and raised questions about 
their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis children. As sex- and 
illegitimacy-based classifications became more constitutionally 
vulnerable, nonmarital fathers began to assert rights to equal 
treatment with mothers and to procedural and substantive due 
process as parents.70 
The first parental rights case brought by a nonmarital father 
to reach the Supreme Court was Peter Stanley’s challenge to an 
Illinois law that conclusively presumed nonmarital fathers unfit 
without affording them so much as a hearing.71 Though the 
Stanley family was white, and court papers contain virtually no 
mention of race, race-salient assumptions likely informed the 
Justices’ deliberations. Many who opposed parental rights for 
men like Stanley worried that affording nonmarital fathers notice 
and an opportunity to be heard would thwart adoptions, long 
considered the normatively desirable “solution” to unwed 
motherhood. But adoption rates varied dramatically by race and 
class. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, white 
middle-class parents often sent unmarried girls and young women 
who became pregnant to maternity homes to give birth, surrender 
their children, and return to the routines of teenage life, 
preserving their future marriageability and allowing childless 
 
 69. I have explored these conflicts in great detail elsewhere. See generally Mayeri, 
Foundling Fathers, supra note 1. 
 70. See id. at Part I. 
 71. For more on the Stanley case, see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 
2309–23; see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Strange Life of Stanley v. Illinois: A Case Study 
in Parent Representation and Law Reform, 41 N.Y.U. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming); 
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois’s Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 773 
(2016). 
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married couples to raise children.72 Adoption was far less common 
in communities of color; young African American women, 
especially in poor and low-income households, usually expected 
to raise their nonmarital children, often with the support and 
assistance of their own parents and kin networks.73 
Early draft opinions in Stanley appear to reflect these 
divergent background narratives. Justice Douglas initially saw the 
Illinois law not as “an invidious discrimination against unwed 
fathers, but rather a protection of illegitimate children.” Most 
unmarried fathers,” he wrote, “are not present at their children’s 
births and like hit-and-run drivers are difficult to locate.” 
Unmarried mothers, Douglas assumed, usually “decide[d] to 
place their offspring in the care of the state.” Children’s best 
interests would be served by “swift and certain placement in 
adoptive homes,” an outcome that rights for biological fathers 
might jeopardize.74  
Justice Marshall’s draft reflected a very different 
understanding of the underlying social conditions and of the 
political economy of impoverished households. The state’s 
characterization of nonmarital fathers as presumptively unfit 
“suffers from the deficiencies of any stereotype,” Marshall wrote. 
“There are many reasons for illegitimacy in our society,” he 
continued, including the “structure of state and federal welfare 
programs” that “provide[d] financial assistance only to children in 
one-parent households.” Accordingly, “a father might decline to 
marry the mother of his children in order to maximize the family’s 
eligibility for financial assistance.” Indeed, “[i]n such 
circumstances, the fact of illegitimacy provides no support 
whatever for the inference that the father lacks concern for his 
children; indeed, it may tend to suggest the contrary conclusion.”75 
Marshall’s opinion in Stanley never saw the light of day 
because Justice Byron White’s draft eventually won a majority, 
and Marshall joined White’s opinion rather than writing a 
 
 72. See generally REGINA KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: 
UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890–1945 
(1993). 
 73. See RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND 
RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1993). 
 74. Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2317. 
 75. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois (manuscript at 5) 
(Nov. 1971) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers [hereinafter 
Marshall Papers], Box 91, Folder 5). 
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separate concurrence. His clerk, Barbara Underwood, had 
recently worked on Marshall’s vehement dissent in Jefferson v. 
Hackney, however, where Marshall addressed—without passing 
judgment on—the constitutional claim of plaintiffs challenging 
Texas’s differential funding of AFDC and other public assistance 
categories as disproportionately affecting African- and Mexican 
American individuals and families. In Jefferson, Marshall 
criticized the district court and his own colleagues for glibly 
concluding that “the fact that AFDC is politically unpopular and 
the fact that AFDC recipients are disfavored by the State and its 
citizens, have nothing whatsoever to do with the racial makeup of 
the program.”76 In Marshall’s view, “at some point a showing that 
state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial 
groups must be relevant.”77 Although Marshall’s dissent in 
Jefferson did not discuss the plaintiffs’ family status discrimination 
claims directly, he cited King v. Smith’s reference to the 
community disapproval visited upon AFDC recipients.78 Reading 
Marshall’s published Jefferson dissent and unpublished Stanley 
opinion together, it seems likely that the racial impact of Illinois’s 
exclusion of nonmarital fathers from parental rights was on his 
mind. 
Despite Justice Marshall’s strong stance against marital 
status discrimination in Stanley, Leon Quilloin’s claim to retain 
parental rights with respect to his son Darrell did not earn his vote 
when it came before the Court six years later. Darrell spent 
several years of his early childhood living in Savannah, Quilloin’s 
hometown, while Darrell’s mother Ardell worked in New York 
and sent money home to help support her son. Court records 
suggest that Darrell’s grandmothers provided most of the day-to-
day care for Darrell while he lived in Savannah. Quilloin testified 
that he provided some financial support when Darrell was an 
infant, including paying for surgery to repair a hernia, and 
purchasing milk and clothing; that he had arranged and paid for 
Darrell to start kindergarten early at a local Catholic school; and 
that he had built a soundproof nursery in the nightclub where he 
worked so that his son could spend more time with him.79 When 
Darrell was five, he moved to New York to join Ardell, who by 
 
 76. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 575 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 575–76. 
 78. Id. at 575 (discussing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 322 (1968)). 
 79. Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2336. 
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then had a new husband and baby son. Quilloin had visited 
Darrell in New York, and paid for his son to travel to Georgia for 
family visits. While the parties disputed the length and frequency 
of these visits, all agreed that Quilloin had given Darrell gifts, such 
as a new bicycle, which his mother felt were “disruptive to family 
harmony.” Her husband, Randall Walcott, wished to adopt 
Darrell and unite the family under a single surname. Recalling his 
own absent father, Quilloin testified that he wished to preserve 
the “little bond between the kid and myself seldom as it’s been” 
and sought visitation.80 
There is little mention of race in the record in Quilloin, other 
than passing references to Quilloin’s mother Mabel Dawson’s 
participation in voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote 
campaigns during the mid- to late 1960s, the period when Darrell 
lived in Savannah.81 As in the other unwed fathers cases, none of 
the briefs argued that laws disadvantaging nonmarital fathers had 
a racially disparate impact. Notably, though, the network of 
extended family care and support that characterized Darrell’s 
early life in Savannah bore a strong resemblance to that of the 
family celebrated in a concurring opinion signed by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall just a few months earlier, in Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland. There, these Justices wrote separately to 
emphasize how a city zoning ordinance criminalizing an African 
American grandmother for taking her orphaned grandson into 
her home denigrated family structures that were especially 
common in black communities.82 
Moore reflected internal disagreement among the Justices 
about the desirability of linking family pluralism with race, 
ethnicity, and class. As Marshall wrote privately to his colleagues, 
“I cannot agree with [the] conclusion that there is no 
constitutionally protected right…for a grandmother to perform 
 
 80. Id. at 2336–37. 
 81. Other sources reveal that Quilloin’s sister, Carolyn Quilloin Coleman, 
participated in lunch counter sit-ins protesting segregation while in high school in the early 
1960s, became a leader in the NAACP, and much later served as a special assistant to the 
governor of North Carolina. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. 2125 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2007) 
(statement of Hon. G.K. Butterfield). 
 82. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). Justice Powell, who ultimately authored the majority opinion, wrote in the 
margins of Brennan’s first draft: “I see no racial overtones here.” See First Draft of 
Dissenting Opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Feb. 14, 1977, Powell Papers, supra 
note 28, at Box 458, Folder 16. 
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the duties of a mother for her grandchildren. . . . I have seen too 
many situations where a strong grandparent literally held the 
family together and was responsible for the education and 
upbringing of decent, law-abiding youngsters, to agree as a matter 
of constitutional law that the ‘nuclear’ family is ‘the basic building 
block of our society.’”83 When Marshall incorporated this 
sentiment into a draft dissent from what was to be Chief Justice 
Burger’s majority opinion upholding the ordinance, he referred to 
grandparent involvement as particularly important among 
“immigrant groups, the poor, and blacks,” and wrote, “I cannot 
agree that the norms of middle-class suburban life set the 
standards of constitutional law for all people at all times.” Justice 
Powell wrote in the margins: “Nonsense! Middle-class may well 
respect the family more than ‘the rich’ or ‘the poor.’ But none of 
these generalizations is much more than loose rhetoric.”84 His 
clerk, David Martin, “like[d Justice Marshall’s draft] very much,” 
but pointed out that “it would not be easy” to join without also 
signing Brennan’s opinion, which went on at much greater length 
about the importance of extended kin networks in African 
American families. Powell replied: “Good—but with racial 
overtones, I’ll not join.”85 
Unlike the other unwed fathers cases, sex equality arguments 
did not play a prominent role in Quilloin. Quilloin sought neither 
full custody nor equal standing with Ardell—he “honestly 
believe[d] that [Darrell’s] rightful place is with his mother.” 
Rather, Quilloin sought to veto Walcott’s adoption of Darrell in 
order to prevent the court from rendering him a legal stranger to 
 
 83. Justice Thurgood Marshall to Chief Justice Warren Burger (cc: the Conference), 
Re: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Nov. 23, 1976, Powell Papers, supra note 28, at Box 
458, Folder 6. Justice Marshall reiterated this view in what was to be a brief, separate 
dissent, later withdrawn after a majority of the Court voted to invalidate the ordinance. 
See Thurgood Marshall, First Draft of Dissenting Opinion in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Feb. 16, 1977, Marshall Papers, supra note 75, at Box 194, Folder 2. Justice 
Stewart took umbrage at an early draft of Justice Brennan’s opinion, which, Stewart wrote 
to his colleagues, “seeks to convey the invidious message that the ordinance…is racially 
discriminatory. Nothing could be further from the truth,” Stewart contended, noting, inter 
alia, that East Cleveland was “over ninety percent Negro . . . .” See Potter Stewart to the 
Conference, Feb. 16, 1977, Marshall Papers, supra note 75, at Box 194, Folder 2. 
 84. Thurgood Marshall, First Draft of Dissenting Opinion in Moore, Feb. 16, 1977, 
Powell Papers, supra note 28, at Box 458, Folder 16. 
 85. Id.; R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
For a fascinating and comprehensive discussion of Moore, see R.A. Lenhardt, The Family 
as Racial Project: Understanding the Real Lessons of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV (forthcoming 2017). 
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his son: he sought to be treated as a “de facto divorced father.” 
Nevertheless, a unanimous Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Marshall, denied Quilloin’s claim. Quilloin, unlike a father 
who had married the mother of his child, or who had lived in the 
same household with his family, had never taken legal or actual 
responsibility for his son. As applied to Quilloin, then, Georgia’s 
statute did not violate equal protection. Whereas in Stanley, 
Justice Marshall had grilled the Illinois attorney general about the 
relevance of a marriage license to Peter Stanley’s relationship to 
his children, in Quilloin he wrote that the state “was not 
foreclosed from recognizing” the difference between a divorced 
and a never-married father’s “extent of commitment to the 
welfare of the child.”86 
There are several possible explanations for Justice 
Marshall’s—and his colleagues’—lack of sympathy for Leon 
Quilloin, none of them mutually exclusive. Melissa Murray has 
argued that Quilloin is consistent with the Court’s preference, in 
the unwed fathers’ cases, for fathers who act like normative 
husbands, providing financial support for their children and living 
together with mothers in the same household.87 Further, unlike 
Peter Stanley, Quilloin’s adversary was not a state department of 
social services proposing to place his child in foster care rather 
than with a biological parent, but rather a fit and caring mother 
and prospective stepfather who had lived with Darrell for a little 
more than half his life. Justice Marshall’s draft opinion in Stanley 
was careful to stipulate that “[t]his case does not present the 
question whether the father and the mother are entitled to equal 
rights in a custody contest between them, and we intimate no 
views on that question, which may involve considerations quite 
different from those presented by this case.”88 
Quilloin therefore presented a host of thorny questions 
Stanley had not broached. The ACLU’s internal correspondence 
reveals advocates deeply torn over whether to provide amicus 
support to Quilloin. On the one hand, civil libertarians and 
poverty lawyers increasingly feared that child welfare authorities 
removed children from their homes and terminated parental 
rights on grounds of neglect when poverty was the real culprit. But 
nonmarital fathers’ parental rights, when they conflicted with 
 
 86. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S 246, 256 (1978). 
 87. Murray, supra note 51, at 402–405. 
 88. Marshall, supra note 75 (manuscript at 7 n.4). 
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mothers’ prerogatives, posed a profound dilemma for many 
feminists. For married couples, feminists wholeheartedly 
supported egalitarian parenting. But when parents divorced—or 
had never been married in the first place—many feminists were 
more ambivalent. If a father had been relatively uninvolved in a 
child’s care during a relationship, perhaps he did not deserve 
equality post-dissolution. And some feminists worried that 
mothers, who bore primary responsibility for the care of 
nonmarital children, would pay an unfair price for nonmarital 
fathers’ rights. The feminist skeptics won this argument in 
Quilloin, and the ACLU ultimately declined to file a brief.89 
Caban v. Mohammed presented the sex discrimination claim 
that Quilloin did not, and Abdiel Caban’s stronger facts—he had 
lived for several years with his children and their mother—
attracted amicus support from the ACLU and other groups. After 
flirting with language that would have embraced full formal 
equality for mothers and fathers, Justice Powell’s opinion for the 
Court embraced sex neutrality in circumstances where a 
nonmarital father had developed a relationship with his children 
comparable to that of their mother.90 Dissenters from the 5-4 
decision continued to express concern that rights for nonmarital 
fathers would jeopardize newborn adoptions, still considered the 
most desirable option for illegitimate children.91 
Caban marked the apex of nonmarital fathers’ constitutional 
rights in the Supreme Court.92 Subsequently, the Court ignored 
cases that presented feminist arguments for sex equality in 
nonmarital parental rights and decided the cases that did produce 
full opinions narrowly on due process grounds, maintaining 
distinctions between fathers based upon marital status. The 
Justices never grappled with the central questions that troubled 
feminists and poverty lawyers—the subordination of women and 
state intrusions on poor families’ autonomy. Instead, the values of 
the divorced fathers’ rights movement and traditionalist 
advocates of adoption animated the Court’s jurisprudence.93 
 
 89. Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2338–40. 
 90. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 91. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394–401 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 401–17 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 92. For more on Caban, see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2342–48. 
 93. Id. at 2378–82. 
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Ironically, the Court consistently rejected claims from 
nonmarital fathers that reflected the experiences of unmarried 
parents of color caring for children, and did not involve the 
feminist dilemma posed by the competing claims of a mother. In 
Fiallo v. Bell, the plaintiffs were fathers and nonmarital children 
denied certain beneficial exemptions available to mothers and 
their nonmarital children and to married parents and their 
children under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Dominican 
national Ramon Fiallo-Sone, whose U.S. citizen son Ramon 
Martin Fiallo could not ease his father’s path to legal residency or 
confer exemption from immigration quotas as he could have if his 
parents had married or if he had been Fiallo’s mother; Serge 
Warner, the West Indian-born son of a naturalized U.S. citizen 
father, Cleophus Warner, who could not bypass the quota system 
to become a permanent resident, as he could have done if his 
mother had been a U.S. citizen, or if his parents had married; and 
teenagers Trevor and Earl Wilson, permanent U.S. residents 
whose Jamaican father Arthur Cecil Wilson could not obtain a 
visa to move to the United States after their mother’s death, 
though a mother or a “legitimate” father could have done so.94 
The named plaintiffs in Fiallo had undertaken nontraditional 
gender roles not unlike the married couples Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
represented in the canonical constitutional sex equality cases of 
the 1970s. According to court papers, Fiallo-Sone “assumed the 
role of primary caretaker and constant companion to his son” 
shortly after the child was born in New York in 1971, while the 
child’s mother, Celia Rodriguez, “assumed the role of bread-
winner.”95 When the class action challenging the discriminatory 
statute and regulations was filed in 1974, Fiallo was “a pre-school 
age child” and “very dependent upon and attached to his father,” 
with whom he lived in Brooklyn.96 For her part, Rodriguez 
continued to support the family financially, and “believe[d] that it 
[was] in the best interests of the child to live with his father in the 
United States.” Short of Fiallo-Sone adopting his son, or marrying 
Rodriguez—to neither of which Rodriguez would consent97—no 
 
 94. Id. at 2328. 
 95. Amended Complaint, Fiallo v. Saxbe, Civ. No. 74 C 1083 (E.D.N.Y.), in Joint 
Appendix at 6, Fiallo v. Bell., 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Court papers explain simply that, “For personal reasons, Ramon Fiallo-Sone and 
Celia Francisca Michel Rodriguez have never married.” Brief for Appellants at 10, Fiallo. 
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path to “legitimation” existed. Accordingly, Fiallo-Sone, who had 
tried and failed to obtain the otherwise necessary labor 
certification, would be unable legally to remain in the United 
States with his son.98 
Like Stephen Wiesenfeld, who sought Social Security 
survivors’ benefits to care for his newborn after his wife Paula, the 
household’s primary breadwinner, died in childbirth,99 Jamaican 
citizen Arthur Cecil Wilson wished to move to the United States 
to care for his teenage sons Trevor and Earl after their mother, 
Leony Moses, passed away. Wilson had lived with and supported 
his sons until they were eleven and nine years old and moved with 
Moses to New York, where the children became permanent 
residents. Granted a temporary emergency visa to visit his sons, 
Wilson had been denied further extensions and returned to 
Jamaica where “he could work [legally] and contribute something 
to the support of his children.”100 Wilson’s chances of obtaining 
the required labor certification to work in the U.S. were nil, as he 
described his skills and work experience as those of a 
“handyman.”101 In the meantime, Trevor and Earl apparently 
lived with their mother’s sister, who supported their efforts to 
obtain permanent residency for Wilson. Plaintiff Serge Warner 
came to the United States at the age of nine to visit his father, who 
had “always supported and maintained him”; shortly thereafter, 
his mother married another man and asked Cleophus, a 
naturalized U.S. citizen, to “keep their son.” Cleophus and Serge 
lived together in Queens thereafter; a defeat in court, they 
averred, would mean that Serge would “be forced to return to a 
country where there is no one to care for him.”102 Because their 
children were over the age of fourteen, Wilson and Warner could 
not become “parents” for the purposes of exemption from the 
 
If Fiallo-Sone were to adopt his biological son, Rodriguez would presumably have had to 
relinquish her own parental rights. 
 98. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 28. Though Fiallo-Sone successfully 
obtained a stay of deportation pending the resolution of the case, he and his son departed 
for the Dominican Republic before he became aware of the stay. Brief for Appellants, 
supra  note 97, at 11 n.11. 
 99. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 100. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 10. 
 101. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 102. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 32. 
MAYERI_DRAFT 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:01 AM 
2017] INTERSECTIONALITY & FAMILY STATUS 407 
 
immigration quota system. Neither man could “cure” his son’s 
illegitimacy by marrying the children’s mother.103 
National origin, gender, family status, and class—in the form 
of an inability to obtain labor certification for low-skilled jobs—
thus combined to prevent the Fiallo plaintiff fathers from 
receiving relief from immigration restrictions that would have 
enabled them to care for their children in the U.S. Relying on a 
small but growing social science literature investigating paternal 
involvement in children’s care and development, and highlighting 
unmarried fathers’ increasing participation in their children’s 
lives, the plaintiffs resisted “stereotypes which depict the father of 
an illegitimate child as having little interest in and only a 
superficial relationship with his child and with the child’s 
mother.”104 Indeed, as their supporters emphasized, Fiallo-Sone’s, 
Wilson’s, and Warner’s demonstrated devotion to their children’s 
care and support throughout their lives belied such 
generalizations. 
In parental rights and stepfather adoption cases such as 
Quilloin and Caban, fathers’ and mothers’ interests clashed; in 
Fiallo, rights for nonmarital fathers aligned with those of mothers. 
Indeed, Ruth Bader Ginsburg wished to file an amicus brief for 
the ACLU, presumably in order to argue that discrimination 
against unwed fathers devalued mothers’ citizenship rights and 
reinforced sex-based stereotypes that assigned the care and 
support of nonmarital children exclusively to mothers. ACLU 
Legal Director Mel Wulf rejected her request, and the Legal Aid 
Society’s brief only gestured to this argument in a footnote.105 
Over a dissent from Justices Brennan and Marshall, who viewed 
them as clearly unconstitutional sex discrimination, a majority of 
the Court upheld the challenged laws as within Congress’s plenary 
power to regulate immigration.106 
 
 103. In order for Cleophus Warner to legitimate Serge under the law of the French 
West Indies, marriage to his mother, Elenore Carmelie Gibs, was required, and she was 
married to another man. The Wilsons’ mother was deceased. 
 104. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 25. 
 105. See Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1329; see also Davis, supra note 
10, at 99. 
 106. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). For more on Fiallo, see Mayeri, Marital 
Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1327–31; Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2327–30. 
The Supreme Court has considered issues similar to those presented in Fiallo in several 
subsequent cases. For more, see id. at 2385–88. Shortly before this essay went to press, the 
Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. ___ (2017) (invalidating provision of 
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Parham v. Hughes, decided by the Court on the same day as 
Caban, also highlighted the claims of nonmarital fathers of color 
who provided not merely financial support but also care and 
nurture to their children. Curtis Parham sought to recover for the 
wrongful death of his six-year-old son Lemuel, who perished in a 
car accident alongside his mother, Cassandra Moreen. Unlike 
Abdiel Caban, Parham had not lived with the mother of his child, 
nor did he have legal custody of Lemuel. Like Leon Quilloin, 
Parham had not formally legitimated his son (though he had 
signed Lemuel’s birth certificate, acknowledging paternity), but 
unlike Quilloin, Parham said that he had consistently provided 
financial support, “maintained charge accounts at grocery stores 
for food and other necessities,”107 visited Lemuel daily, and taken 
care of him on many weekends.108 Indeed, Richmond County 
Superior Court Judge Franklin H. Pierce characterized Parham as 
having “in every respect treated [Lemuel] as his own.”109 And 
unlike Quilloin—and Caban—Parham presented no obvious 
feminist dilemma: his claim did not conflict with Lemuel’s 
mother’s rights.110 
Indeed, at least insofar as court records reveal, Quilloin’s and 
Parham’s claims arose from caregiving arrangements that 
deviated from the ideal of the marital nuclear family but reflected 
the reality of many families of color: cooperation between 
extended family members (the grandmothers who helped Leon 
Quilloin care for Darrell in Savannah while his mother worked in 
New York) and non-cohabiting parents who did not live in 
marriage-like households but nevertheless participated in what 
we would now call co-parenting (Parham and Moreen). In 
 
derivative citizenship law’s differential residency requirements for U.S. citizen fathers and 
mothers of nonmarital children born abroad). 
 107. Order, Parham v. Hughes, Findings of Fact, in Joint Appendix at 6, Parham v. 
Hughes, 447 U.S. 347 (1979). 
 108. The lower court found that “Curtis Parham visited regularly with the deceased 
child and in fact saw him virtually every day and had the child with him on many 
weekends.” Order, supra note 107, at 6. 
 109. Pierce rejected the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that given 
fathers’ primary support obligation under Georgia law, “where the father of an illegitimate 
child in fact has provided some level of support for that child and has acknowledged his 
paternity by execution of the birth certificate and has in every respect treated the child as 
his own, the State cannot constitutionally deny that father the right to maintain an action 
for the wrongful death of his child where the mother of said child is also deceased.” Order, 
supra note 107, at 6. 
 110. His claim may have conflicted with the rights of Lemuel’s maternal grandmother, 
though there is no indication in the record that this affected the Justices’ deliberations. 
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contrast, Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed had lived together 
with their children but had a troubled history that may have 
included domestic violence (Mohammed alleged that their 
relationship dissolved in part because Caban “beat her without 
reason”) and Caban absconding with the children to Puerto 
Rico.111 
A decade before Parham reached the U.S. Supreme Court, a 
different collection of Justices had ruled in Glona v. American 
Guarantee and Liability Company that a Louisiana statute 
denying mothers of illegitimate children the right to sue for their 
wrongful death violated the federal constitution.112 Like Curtis 
Parham, Minnie Brade Glona had lost her son in an automobile 
accident. Like Parham, Glona did not have amici arguing on her 
behalf. Unlike Parham, Glona was a mother and brought her case 
in the waning days of the Warren Court, both of which likely 
contributed to the more sympathetic reception her claim received. 
Whereas the Court invalidated Louisiana’s exclusion of mothers 
from wrongful death recovery in 1968, in 1979 a bare majority of 
the Court rejected Curtis Parham’s claim.113 Justice Potter 
Stewart’s plurality opinion ignored the Glona precedent, 
declaring that the illegitimacy cases rested upon the premise that 
penalizing children for the transgressions of their parents was 
“illogical and unjust,” a rationale inapplicable to a parent’s claim. 
And Stewart rejected Parham’s sex-based equal protection claim 
on the ground that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children 
simply were not “similarly situated.” Justice Powell, author of 
Caban—handed down the same day—disagreed with the 
plurality’s view that Georgia’s law did not discriminate on the 
basis of sex, but found the distinction between fathers and 
mothers to be substantially related to the important governmental 
objective of avoiding the difficulties associated with proving 
paternity.114 
In the following decade, race, sex, and even class mostly 
disappeared from the jurisprudence of nonmarital fatherhood. In 
contrast to the 1970s plaintiffs, all of whom had been indigent, of 
color, or both, the 1980s plaintiffs were white and working or 
middle class. The Court avoided deciding two cases that squarely 
 
 111. See Joint Appendix, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 112. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Cas. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 113. Parham v. Hughes, 447 U.S. 347 (1979). 
 114. Id. at 359–61 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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raised sex discrimination claims—both involving the adoption of 
newborns by strangers—and instead decided Lehr v. Robertson 
(stepfather adoption) and Michael H. v. Gerald D. (marital 
presumption) narrowly, on due process grounds that solidified the 
legal primacy of marriage but did not consider the ramifications 
of fathers’ parental rights for sex equality.115 As the intersectional 
experience of nonmarital fathers of color faded into the 
background, the Court continued to evaluate the constitutionality 
of family status and sex discrimination using measures that had 
little to do with the concerns of poverty lawyers and feminists who 
weighed government intrusion into poor families and the 
subordination of women heavily in the balance.116 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional canon of family status largely ignores the 
race, gender, and even class-based implications of privileging 
marriage and marital families. This silence endured despite 
constitutional arguments by plaintiffs and their advocates that 
highlighted the class- and race-based disparate impact of marital 
supremacy; how discrimination against illegitimate children and 
their parents subordinated women by imposing economic burdens 
on those responsible for nonmarital children’s care and support, 
curtailing reproductive freedom, and punishing nonmarital 
sexuality; and the importance of fathers’ care and nurturance as 
well as financial support for children, regardless of birth status. 
Indeed, litigants, scholars, and advocates advanced expansive 
conceptions of sexual citizenship, feminist accounts of illegitimacy 
penalties’ harm, and, to some degree, a vision of nonmarital 
fatherhood that valued care and nurturance as well as the 
financial support prioritized by lawmakers and judges. 
In theory, a constitutional regime protective of non-
normative family status and reflective of these more expansive 
visions of individual freedom and family pluralism would not 
necessarily incorporate racial, economic, or even gender equality 
rationales. It is possible to imagine a constitutional jurisprudence 
that is universalist in scope and uses the experiences of 
 
 115. For much more on Lehr and Michael H., see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra 
note 1, at 2362–73. On the cases the Court avoided and decided during this period, see id. 
at 2354–63 (discussing Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene and McNamara v. 
Department of Social Services). 
 116. For more, see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2373–82. 
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marginalized communities as the starting point for thinking about 
which negative rights should be protected from government 
intrusion, and which positive rights should be promoted by 
constitutional law and public policy. Such a jurisprudence might 
consider family pluralism a positive value, and adaptive, 
nonmarital, and extended family structures a normative ideal 
rather than a deviation from the nuclear family norm. It is also 
possible to imagine a gender-neutral vision of individual 
autonomy and of parenting that values sexual freedom and 
valorizes and rewards caregiving regardless of who performs it, 
and in which the state takes an active role in supporting sole 
parenting, co-parenting, and extended family care irrespective of 
family structure or marital status. 
Conversely, the recognition that illegitimacy penalties have a 
race- and class-based disparate impact by no means guarantees a 
substantively progressive jurisprudence of family status. Race-
based disparate impact arguments arguably helped judges who 
were sympathetic to civil rights to see injustice in the illegitimacy 
cases. In the welfare rights cases such arguments were a second-
best constitutional hook—better than relying on reversible 
statutory interpretation grounds but less salutary than recognizing 
a constitutional right to subsistence. But race and even poverty-
based discrimination arguments also were perfectly compatible 
with an approach that focused on the harm of penalizing 
blameless children for the “sins” or “transgressions” of their 
parents, and with a Moynihanian focus on ascertaining paternity 
and holding fathers to account for child support. Similarly, the 
unwed fathers cases, and the divorced fathers’ rights movement, 
illustrate how sex discrimination arguments that focus on formal 
equality may help individual men achieve positive results but do 
not necessarily address, and may in some circumstances 
aggravate, the subordination of women. The feminist dilemma—
how to promote paternal involvement in caregiving without 
impinging on maternal prerogatives under conditions of gender-
based social and economic inequality—left many feminists 
ambivalent, at best, about the utility of formal sex equality in 
nonmarital parenthood. 
What is lost, then, in the constitutional family status cases, is 
the substance of the claims plaintiffs and advocates derived from 
intersectional experience: how women, especially women of color, 
suffer the economic burdens of laws that deprive “illegitimate” 
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children of public and private support; how laws that penalize 
nonmarital sexuality violate women’s sexual autonomy and 
reproductive freedom; how laws that limit fathers’ rights—
especially when there are no competing maternal rights at stake—
redound to the detriment of all parents by discouraging and 
demeaning caregiving work performed by men, and by 
diminishing the benefits of women’s citizenship. It is not the 
disappearance of race, class, and sex discrimination theories per 
se, but rather the erasure of the lived experience at the 
intersection of these categories that impoverishes the 
constitutional law of family status. 
